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Abstract
The paper concerns the study of a class of convex, constrained multiobjective optimization problems from the viewpoint of the
existence issues. The main feature of the presented approach is that the classical qualification condition requiring the existence of
interior points in the effective domains of functions under consideration does not hold. A variant of duality theory for multiobjective
optimization problems based on the Fenchel theorem is formulated. Next, by using very recent results on the Walrasian general
equilibrium model of economy obtained in Naniewicz [Z. Naniewicz, Pseudo-monotonicity and economic equilibrium problem in
reflexive Banach space, Math. Oper. Res. 32 (2007) 436–466] the conditions ensuring the existence of Pareto optimal solutions
for the class of multiobjective optimization problems are established. The concept of the proper efficiency is used as the solution
notion. Finally, a new version of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics is presented.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to present some existence results for convex multiobjective optimization problems of the
form
v-Minimize f (x) = (fj (x))= (f1(x), . . . , fm(x))
subject to x ∈ Σ ⊂ X.
}
(P˜ )
To achieve this goal the existence results obtained for the general equilibrium model of economy in reflexive Banach
spaces in Naniewicz [22] are applied. The notation “v-Minimize” refers to a vector minimum problem for which the
solution is understood as the so-called properly efficient vector x ∈ Σ which is a minimizer of the scalarized problem
m∑
j=1
λjfj (x) → min, x ∈ Σ,
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results obtained refer to the case in which the objective functions do not satisfy the classical (based on the existence
of interior points) qualification condition.
Using some ideas from [29–31] where the duality theory for multiobjective optimization problems has been derived
by applying the Fenchel–Rockafellar perturbation technique, we construct the variant of the duality theory based on
the Fenchel theorem (see [2,3,24]). As in the aforementioned papers, to any Pareto optimal (properly efficient) vector
there corresponds m-tuple of dual variables called here an allocation. It provides optimality conditions in terms of
the conjugates of the objective functions under consideration. The duality scheme developed here allows to look
at a price vector of the general equilibrium model of economy (see [1,15]) as a Pareto optimal (properly efficient)
vector for a certain multiobjective optimization problem. This vector is expressed in terms of the conjugates of dis-
utility functions in question. In consequence, it is possible to establish some new existence results for a class of
multiobjective optimization problems in which the effective domains of conjugates of the objective functions need
not to have nonempty interiors. This case is of importance when dealing with multiobjective optimization problems
in reflexive Banach spaces where the positive cones (orthants) have empty interiors—Lp spaces, for instance.
There is an abundant literature on various aspects of duality in multiobjective optimization problems. In this respect
we refer the reader to [5,9,10,12,27,28,30,31] and references therein. The general theory of multiobjective optimiza-
tion can be found in the monographs [6,11,12,14,23] and the bibliographies there.
It is worth to pay special attention to certain new directions in the theory of nonconvex multiobjective optimization
based on such mathematical tools like the extremal principle, the generalized differential, the set-valued counterparts
of Ekeland variational principle (see [4,16–19] and the references quoted there).
2. Fenchel duality and Pareto optima
Let X be a reflexive Banach space with its dual X. The pairing over X × X will be denoted by 〈·,·〉. Let Σ ⊂ X
be a closed, convex, nonempty subset of X. Assume
fj : X →R∪ {+∞}, j = 1, . . . ,m, (1)
to be convex, proper and lower semicontinuous functions.
We study a multiobjective optimization problem of the form:
v-Minimize f (x) = (fj (x))= (f1(x), . . . , fm(x))
subject to x ∈ Σ.
}
(P˜ )
Definition 1. x ∈ Σ is said to be a properly efficient solution (vector) of (P˜ ) if there exists α = (αj ) ∈ Int(Rn+) such
that x is a solution of the scalarized problem:
Minimize
m∑
j=1
αjfj (x)
subject to x ∈ Σ.
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (Pα)
In the terminology of [12] such x is called a properly Edgeworth–Pareto solution of (P˜ ).
Define the support function of Σ by Ψ (τ) := supy∈Σ 〈τ, y〉, τ ∈ X. For a finite collection of functions fj : X →R
define its infimal convolution as
m

j=1
fj (x) = inf∑m
j=1 xj=x
m∑
j=1
fj (xj ), x ∈ X. (2)
Recall that mj=1 fj as being convex may fail to be lower semicontinuous, however( m

j=1
fj
)
(τ ) =
m∑
f j (τ ), τ ∈ X, (3)j=1
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m∑
j=1
fj
)
(τ )
( m

j=1
f j
)
(τ ), τ ∈ X. (4)
The infimal convolution mj=1 f j is said to be exact at τ ∈ X if there is a decomposition τ =
∑m
j=1 τj such that(
m∑
j=1
fj
)
(τ ) =
( m

j=1
f j
)
(τ ) =
m∑
j=1
f j (τj ).
One of the well-known consequences of the convex duality theory is the fact that if Int(
⋂m
j=1 Dom(fj )) 
= ∅, then
mj=1 f j is exact at each point of X (cf. Proposition 3.4, p. 43 [3], see also [25] and [2]).
Our first result reads as follows.
Theorem 2. Suppose that vector x ∈ Σ is a properly efficient solution of (P˜ ), i.e. a solution of the scalarized problem
(Pα) for some α ∈ Int(Rm+). Moreover, assume the qualification condition
0 ∈
(
m⋂
j=1
Int
(
Dom(fj )
))− Σ. (CQ1)
Then there exists a m-tuple (πj ) ∈ (X)m associated with x, such that
(i)
m∑
j=1
πj ∈ ∂ indΣ
(
x
);
(ii) − 1
αj
πj ∈ ∂fj
(
x
) for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m};
(iii) (πj ) minimizes
m∑
j=1
αjf

j
(
− 1
αj
πj
)
+ Ψ
(
m∑
j=1
πj
)
−→ min.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(5)
Definition 3. The m-tuple (πj ) will be called the dual allocation associated with x, or dual allocation of (P˜ ).
Proof. Suppose that vector x ∈ Σ is a properly efficient solution of (P˜ ) corresponding to α ∈ Int(Rm+). Hence when
setting φ(x) :=∑mj=1 αjfj (x), x ∈ Σ , we can formulate the problem
v := inf
x∈X
{
φ(x)+ indΣ(x)
}= φ(x)+ indΣ(x)= m∑
j=1
αjfj
(
x
)
. (6)
According to the Fenchel duality theory (cf. [2,3]) the dual of (6) is formulated as follows:
v := inf
τ∈X
{
φ(−τ)+Ψ (τ)}= inf
τ∈X
{(
m∑
j=1
(αjfj )
)
(−τ)+Ψ (τ)
}
. (7)
Note that (CQ1) implies
⋂m
j=1 Int(Dom(αjfj )) 
= ∅ which ensures that the infimal convolutionmj=1(αjfj ) is exact.
Hence for any τ ∈ X there exists a decomposition τ =∑mj=1 τj with(
m∑
(αjfj )
)
(−τ) =
( m

j=1
(αjfj )

)
(−τ) =
m∑
(αjfj )
(−τj ) =
m∑
αjf

j
(
− 1
αj
τj
)
.j=1 j=1 j=1
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⋂m
j=1 Dom(fj ) − Σ), thus by the Fenchel theorem (cf. [3]) there exists
π ∈ X with a decomposition π =∑mj=1 πj such that
v =
m∑
j=1
αjf

j
(
− 1
αj
πj
)
+Ψ (π),
v + v = 0.
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (8)
Combining (6) and (8) yields
m∑
j=1
αjfj
(
x
)+ m∑
j=1
αjf

j
(
− 1
αj
πj
)
+Ψ (π) = 0, (9)
which can be written as
m∑
j=1
αjfj
(
x
)+ m∑
j=1
αjf

j
(
− 1
αj
πj
)
+
m∑
j=1
〈
πj , x

〉− 〈π,x〉+ Ψ (π) = 0. (10)
Further, from the Fenchel inequality it follows
fj
(
x
)+ f j (− 1αj πj
)

〈
− 1
αj
πj , x

〉
, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (11)
Ψ (π)
〈
π,x
〉
. (12)
Thus in view of (10) we get the equalities
fj
(
x
)+ f j (− 1αj πj
)
=
〈
− 1
αj
πj , x

〉
, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (13)
Ψ (π) = 〈π,x〉 (14)
which are equivalent to
− 1
αj
πj ∈ ∂fj
(
x
)
, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (15)
m∑
j=1
πj = π ∈ ∂ indΣ
(
x
)
. (16)
This implies easily (5). The proof is complete. 
Corollary 4. From Theorem 2 it follows that the sufficient condition for the multiobjective optimization problem (P˜ )
to admit a properly efficient solution is that ∃(αj ) ∈ Int(Rm+) and ∃(πj ) ∈ (X)m such that
0 ∈ ∂Ψ
(
m∑
j=1
πj
)
−
m⋂
j=1
∂f j
(
− 1
αj
πj
)
, (17)
or equivalently,
0 ∈
⋃
(βj )∈Int(Rm+)
(τj )∈(X)m
[
∂Ψ
(
m∑
j=1
τj
)
−
m⋂
j=1
∂f j
(
− 1
βj
τj
)]
. (18)
Corollary 5. The special case occurs when Σ = X (no constraints, or constraints incorporated in the definition of
objective functions). Then Ψ = ind{0} and because of ∂ ind{0}(0) = X, (17) in Corollary 4 reduces to the statement:
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there exist an allocation (πj ) ∈ (X)m with ∑mj=1 πj = 0 and (αj ) ∈ Int(Rm+) such that
m⋂
j=1
∂f j
(
− 1
αj
πj
)

= ∅. (19)
Remark 6. The condition (19) can be regarded as Fermat’s role for the multiobjective optimization problem under
consideration.
Remark 7. An allocation (πj ) in Theorem 2 constitutes a minimizer for the function defined in (5)(iii). This suggests
introducing the parametrized family of scalar minimization problems (P α )α∈Int(Rm+) by
Minimize f α (τ ) :=
(
m∑
j=1
(αjfj )
)
(−τ)+ Ψ (τ)
subject to τ = (τj ) ∈
(
X
)m
.
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (P α )
To each scalar optimization problem (P α ) one can assign the following multiobjective optimization problem
v-Minimize f˜ α (τ ) :=
(
Ψ
(
m∑
j=1
τj
)
, f 1
(
− 1
α1
τ1
)
, . . . , f m
(
− 1
αm
τm
))
subject to τ = (τj ) ∈
(
X
)m
.
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (P˜ α )
Definition 8. π = (πj ) ∈ (X)m will be called the properly efficient allocation of (P˜ α ) if it is a solution of the
following scalarized problem:
Minimize f α,β(τ ) :=
m∑
j=1
βjf

j
(
− 1
αj
τj
)
+ Ψ
(
m∑
j=1
τj
)
subject to τ = (τj ) ∈
(
X
)m
,
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (P α,β )
for some β ∈ Int(Rm+).
From the Fenchel theorem we get immediately the following results concerning the existence of properly efficient
solutions to (P˜ ) and (P˜ α ).
Theorem 9. If for some α ∈ Int(Rm+) the qualification condition
0 ∈ Int
(
m∑
j=1
Dom
(
αjf

j
)+ DomΨ), (CQ2)
then (P˜ ) has at least one properly efficient vector.
Proof. In the framework of Fenchel’s theory the dual of the minimization problem (P α ) takes the form
m∑
j=1
αjfj (x)+ indΣ(x) −→ min, (20)
and according to the Fenchel theorem the hypothesis (CQ2) ensures its solvability (see [3]). This completes the
proof. 
Theorem 10. If (CQ1) holds, then for each α ∈ Int(Rm+) the problem (P˜ α ) has at least one properly efficient allocation.
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0 ∈ Int
(
Dom
(
m∑
j=1
αjfj
)
−Σ
)
which by the Fenchel theorem ensures that the scalar minimization problem(
m∑
j=1
(αjfj )
)
(τ )+ Ψ (τ) → min
has a solution π . From (CQ1) it follows also that the infimal convolution mj=1(αjfj ) is exact. Hence the decom-
position results π =∑mj=1 πj from which by the procedure already explained we conclude that (πj ) is a solution
of (P α ). Consequently, the allocation (πj ) is a solution of (P˜ α ), as desired. 
Remark 11. Note that the qualification condition (CQ2) in Theorem 9 is too strong in many important cases be-
cause it requires the existence of interior points in effective domains of conjugates of the objective functions under
consideration.
In the next section an important class of problems will be shown, where (CQ2) can be replaced by weaker hypothe-
ses, still ensuring the existence of solutions for the corresponding multiobjective optimization problems.
3. Competitive equilibria and Pareto optimality
Assume K ⊂ X to be a closed, convex, pointed cone (i.e. K ∩ (−K) = 0) with the associated positive dual K+ =
{τ ∈ X: 〈τ, x〉  0 ∀x ∈ K}. It must be stressed that K is not required to have nonempty interior. Let Vj : K→
R ∪ {+∞}, j = 1, . . . ,m, be convex lower semicontinuous functions. From now on the notation will be used: V j :=
Vj + indK. Further, let φj : K+ → R+ be convex, continuous, positively homogeneous of degree 1 functions with
nonnegative values on K+. Set Φ = ∑mj=1 φ. Since Φ : K+ → R is a convex, lower semicontinuous, positively
homogeneous of degree 1 function with Dom(Φ) = K+, there exists a nonempty convex closed subset Δ ⊂ X such
that Δ ⊃ Δ−K and Φ(τ) = supy∈Δ〈τ, y〉, τ ∈K+.
In [22] the following problem related to the general equilibrium model of economy has been studied (see also [21]):
Find π ∈K+ and xj ∈K, j = 1, . . . ,m, such as to satisfy the conditions:
Vj (xj ) = min
{
Vj (x): 〈π,x〉 φj (π), x ∈K
}
, j = 1, . . . ,m, (PM)〈
τ − π,−
m∑
j=1
xj
〉
+Φ(τ)−Φ(π) 0, ∀τ ∈K+, (PE)
and the following existence result has been established:
Theorem 12. (See [22].) Let X be a reflexive Banach space. Suppose that there exists μ > 0 such that
‖x + y‖ μ(‖x‖ + ‖y‖), ∀x, y ∈K
and Δ ∩K ⊂ BX(0,C) = {y ∈ X: ‖y‖ C} for some C > 0. Let F0 be a finite dimensional subspace of X. Assume
that for any j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the following hypotheses hold:
(A1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom(V j ));
(A12) One of the two conditions below holds:
(i) For any τ ∈K+ \ {0} with φj (τ ) = 0, if −tnτn ∈ ∂V j (xn), tn → +∞ in R, τn ⇀ τ weakly in X, xn ⇀ x
weakly in X and 〈τn, xn〉 → 0, then lim infn→∞ V j (−tnτn) > −∞,
(ii) or Dom(V j ) is closed.
Moreover, assume that
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⋃m
j=1 ∂V j (0) ⊂ F0;
(A4) Φ(τ) =∑mj=1 φj (τ ) γ ‖τ‖, ∀τ ∈K+, γ > 0;
(A5) For at least one j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, 0 /∈ ∂V j (0);
(A6) (
∑m
j=1 ∂V j (0)) ∩Δ = ∅.
Then there exists (π, (xj ), (αj ), r) ∈K+ ×Km × (R+ ∪ {+∞})m × (0,1] with π 
= 0, such that
−αjπ ∈ ∂V j (xj )
〈π,xj 〉 − φj (π) ∈ ∂ ind0(αj )
}
if αj ∈R+,
−π ∈ ∂∞V j (xj )
〈π,xj 〉 = φj (π) = 0
}
if αj = +∞,
j ∈ Ξ ⇒ αj > 0,
Φ(τ)− Φ(π)
〈
τ − π, 1
r
m∑
j=1
xj
〉
∀τ ∈K+,
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(PW)
where
Ξ = {j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: 〈τ, y〉 > φj (τ) for any τ ∈K+ \ {0} and y ∈ ∂V j (0) if ∂V j (0) 
= ∅, or ∂V j (0) = ∅}.
(21)
Here ∂∞ϕ : X → 2X stands for the asymptotic subdifferential of ϕ : X →R∪ {+∞}, defined for x ∈ Dom(ϕ) by
∂∞ϕ(x) = {τ ∈ X: (τ,0) ∈ Nepiϕ(x,ϕ(x))},
where Nepiϕ(x,ϕ(x)) stands for the normal cone to the epigraph of ϕ at (x,ϕ(x)) ∈ epiϕ [8,25,26]. We also refer the
reader to the variational approach to economic equilibrium problems developed in [13].
Now we impose hypotheses ensuring all the Lagrange multipliers to be positive and finite, i.e. αj ∈ (0,+∞) for
each j = 1, . . . ,m. It can be achieved if (cf. [22])
(A7) Ξ = {1, . . . ,m}
and (A12) is replaced by
(A2) For any −βnτn ∈ ∂V j (xn) such that βn → +∞, ‖τn‖ = 1 and {xn} bounded, the implication below holds:
If
〈
τn, xn
〉→ 0 then lim inf
n→∞ φj
(
τn
)
> 0. (22)
Under the hypotheses (A2) and (A7) all the αj ’s in (PW) are positive and finite, consequently r = 1.
Accordingly, from Theorem 12 we are led to the existence result that will be used in our further investigations.
Theorem 13. Let X be a reflexive Banach space. Suppose that there exists μ > 0 such that
‖x + y‖ μ(‖x‖ + ‖y‖), ∀x, y ∈K
and Δ ∩K ⊂ BX(0,C) for some C > 0. Let F0 be a finite dimensional subspace of X. Suppose that the hypotheses
(A1)–(A7) hold. Then there exists (π, (xj ), (αj )) ∈K+ ×Km × Int(Rm+) with π 
= 0, such that
−αjπ ∈ ∂V j (xj ),
〈π,xj 〉 − φj (π) = 0,
Φ(τ)− Φ(π)
〈
τ − π,
m∑
j=1
xj
〉
∀τ ∈K+.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(PW0)
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From (PW0) it follows
1
αj
Vj (xj )+ 1
αj
V j (−αjπ) = −〈π,xj 〉, j = 1, . . . ,m,
Φ(π) =
m∑
j=1
φj (π) =
m∑
j=1
〈π,xj 〉 =
〈
π,
m∑
j=1
xj
〉
, (23)
from which we have
m∑
j=1
1
αj
Vj (xj )+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
+
m∑
j=1
(
1
αj
V j
)
(−π)+ Φ(π) = 0. (24)
It is easy to notice (thanks to ( 1
αj
V j )
(·) = 1
αj
V j (αj ·)) that this equality is related to the minimization problems:
X  y −→
(
m∑
j=1
(
1
αj
V j
))
(y) + indΔ(y) −→ min (25)
and its dual
X  τ −→
m∑
j=1
(
1
αj
V j
)
(−τ)+ Φ(τ) −→ min, (26)
and means that y =∑mj=1 xj and τ = π are their solutions, respectively (cf. [3]).
Corollary 15. If (π, (xj )) ∈ X ×Xm is a competitive equilibrium, then the price vector π is:
1. Minimizer of the scalar optimization problem:
Minimize Fα(π) :=
m∑
j=1
1
αj
V j (−αjπ)+ Φ(π)
subject to π ∈K+ \ {0}.
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (Qα)
2. Properly efficient solution of the multiobjective optimization problem:
v-Minimize F˜ α (π) :=
(
Φ(π),V 1(−α1π), . . . , V m(−αmπ)
)
subject to π ∈K+ \ {0}.
}
(Q˜α)
Moreover, the allocation x = (xj ) is:
1. A solution of the scalar minimization problem:
Minimize Fα(x) :=
m∑
j=1
1
αj
V j (xj )+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
subject to (xj ) ∈Km.
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (Qα)
2. A properly efficient solution of the multiobjective optimization problem:
v-Minimize F˜ (x) =
(
indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
,V 1(x1), . . . , V m(xm)
)
subject to (xj ) ∈Km.
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (Q˜)
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do not require:
(i) The preference relations determined by dis-utility functions V j to be locally nonsatiated (minimizers of V j are
allowed).
(ii) The existence of interior points in the effective domains of functions under consideration and in the cone K.
(iii) Any variant of the condition called ω-properness [1,7,15] imposed on preferences to compensate for the absence
of interior points in the positive cone K.
On the basis of Theorem 13 we are allowed to formulate some existence results for a class of multiobjective
optimization problems.
Corollary 17. Assume all the hypotheses of Theorem 13. Then there exists α ∈ Int(Rm+) such that (Q˜α) has at least
one nontrivial properly efficient vector.
Corollary 18. Assume all the hypotheses of Theorem 13. Then there exists α ∈ Int(Rm+) such that (Q˜α) has at least
one properly efficient allocation.
4. Existence of Pareto optimal solutions
Now consider the case of V j , j = 1, . . . ,m, being positive homogeneous of degree σj > 0, j = 1, . . . ,m, respec-
tively. Since π is a solution of (Qα), we get
m∑
j=1
α
σj−1
j V

j (−π) +Φ(π) −→ min. (27)
Accordingly, π is a properly efficient optimal solution of the multiobjective optimization problem:
v-Minimize
(
Φ(π),V 1(−π), . . . , V m(−π)
)
subject to π ∈K+ \ {0}.
}
(Q˜)
Thus we are led to the existence result for multiobjective optimization problem involving objective functions positive
homogeneous of an arbitrary positive degree.
Theorem 19. Assume all the hypotheses of Theorem 13. Moreover, suppose that V j are positive homogeneous of
degree σj > 0, j = 1, . . . ,m. Then the multiobjective optimization problem (Q˜) admits at least one non trivial
properly efficient vector π ∈ K+ (π 
= 0). Moreover, there exist α ∈ Int(Rm+) and an allocation (xj )mj=1 ∈ Km such
that
(i) π ∈ ∂ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
;
(ii) −αjπ ∈ ∂V j (xj ) for each j = 1, . . . ,m.
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (28)
Consequently, x = (xj ) is a properly efficient allocation for the multiobjective problem (Q˜) and a solution for the
scalarized minimization problem (Qα).
Remark 20. If Int(K) = ∅, then the counterpart of the qualification condition (CQ2) for the multiobjective optimiza-
tion problem (Q˜) does not hold and Theorem 9 does not apply. This happens when X = Lp(Ω), 1 < p < ∞, and
K= {x ∈ X: x  0, a.e. in Ω}, for instance.
Theorem 13 can also be seen as the existence result for the multiobjective optimization problem (Q˜).
Theorem 21. Assume all the hypotheses of Theorem 13. Then the problem (Q˜) admits at least one properly efficient
allocation x = (xj ) ∈Km.
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neous. At the beginning of the study suppose that V j do not have minimizers, i.e. ∂V j (0) = ∅ for each j = 1, . . . ,m.
Moreover, φj (τ ) = 1mΦ(τ) ∀τ ∈K+. As previously, assume that Φ(τ) γ ‖τ‖, τ ∈K+. Hence φj (τ ) γj‖τ‖ with
γj = γm . Under the foregoing hypotheses Theorem 13 takes the form
Theorem 22. Let X be a reflexive Banach space. Suppose that there exists μ > 0 such that
‖x + y‖ μ(‖x‖ + ‖y‖), ∀x, y ∈K, (29)
and Δ ∩ K ⊂ BX(0,C) = {y ∈ X: ‖y‖  C} for some C > 0. Assume that for any j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the following
hypotheses hold:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom(V j ));
(H2) Φ(τ) γ ‖τ‖ ∀τ ∈K+, γ > 0;
(H3) ∂V j (0) = ∅.
Then there exists (π, (xj ), (αj )) ∈ K+ × Km × Int(Rm+) with π 
= 0, such that (PW0) holds with φj = 1mΦ , j =
1, . . . ,m.
Remark 23. Without loss of generality one can suppose that π in Theorem 22 fulfills the requirement that ‖π‖ = c > 0
with arbitrarily chosen positive c. The constant c will be specified later when necessary.
Now, for s = (sj ) ∈ Int(Rm+) define V sj (y) := V j (sj y), y ∈K, j = 1, . . . ,m. It is easy to see that the new defined
functions fulfill all the requirements of Theorem 22. Therefore there exists (πs, (xsj ), (α
s
j )) ∈ K+ × Km × Int(Rm+)
with ‖πs‖ = c, c > 0, such that
−α
s
j
sj
πs ∈ ∂V j
(
sj x
s
j
)
,〈
πs, xsj
〉− φj (πs)= 0,
Φ(τ)−Φ(πs) 〈τ − πs, m∑
j=1
xsj
〉
∀τ ∈K+.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(PWs )
It leads to the statement that
m∑
j=1
1
αsj
V j
(
sj x
s
j
)+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xsj
)
→ min,
m∑
j=1
1
αsj
V j
(
−α
s
j
sj
πs
)
+ Φ(πs) → min.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ (30)
Thus in order to show that (Q˜) has a solution it is sufficient to arrange conditions under which the Lagrange multi-
pliers (αsj ) coincide with (sj ). In other words, we have to ensure that a mapping (possibly multivalued) which assigns
to (sj ) the corresponding Lagrange multipliers (αsj ) possesses a fixed point.
Let us recall that Φ = indΔ with Δ ∩K ⊂ BX(0,C). From (29) it follows that if ∑mj=1 xj ∈ Δ, (xj ) ∈Km, then
‖xj‖ < Cmμm−1 for each j = 1, . . . ,m.
Now we claim that under the additional assumption
(H4) ∂V j (0) = ∅, j = 1, . . . ,m,
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s = (sj ) ∈
m∏
j=1
[σj ,∞) ⇒
(
αsj
) ∈ m∏
j=1
[σj ,∞). (31)
Here
∏m
j=1[σj ,∞) stands for the Cartesian m-product of [σj ,∞). On the contrary, suppose that this is not true. Thus,
for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} there exists a sequence sn ∈∏mj=1(0,∞) for which αsnj < snj with snj → 0 as n → ∞. Taking
into account that
αs
n
j
snj
< 1, −α
sn
j
snj
πs
n ∈ ∂V j (snj xs
n
j ), ‖πs
n‖ = c and ‖xj‖  Cmμm−1 one can suppose that snj xs
n
j → 0
in X, and
αs
n
j
snj
πs
n
⇀ π˜ weakly in X for some π˜ ∈ K+. By the maximal monotonicity this leads to −π˜ ∈ ∂V j (0)
what contradicts the assumption (H4). The claim has been established.
Further, since V j are convex proper and lower semicontinuous, there exist aj , bj  0 with
V j (y)−aj − bj‖y‖, ∀y ∈K, j = 1, . . . ,m. (32)
From (PWs)1 and (H1) it follows
V j (y) − V j (sj xsj )
〈
−α
s
j
sj
πs, y − sj xsj
〉
, ∀y ∈K,
which thanks to
∑m
j=1 xsj ∈ Δ and 〈πs, xsj 〉 = φj (πs) implies
cγ
m
αsj = cγjαsj  αsjφj
(
πs
)= αsj 〈πs, xsj 〉 V j (sj y) − V j (sj xsj )+ αsj 〈πs, y〉
 V j (sj y)+ αsj c‖y‖ + aj + bj sj
C
mμm−1
, ∀y ∈ Dom(V j ).
Fix yj ∈ Dom(V j ) in such a way to fulfill the requirements ‖yj‖ γ2m and V j (sj yj ) dj + 1 where
dj := max
{
0, inf
‖y‖ γ2m
s∈[σj ,+∞)
V j (sy)
}
.
Note that due to (H1), dj < ∞. Consequently, we are led to the estimate
αsj 
2m(dj + 1)+ 2maj + 2bj sj Cμm−1
cγ
. (33)
Now we are ready to precise the value of the constant c as mentioned in Remark 23. Choose c > 0 with 2bj Cμm−1 < cγ
for each j = 1, . . . ,m. This allows to find Sj > 0 such that
2m(dj + 1)+ 2maj + 2bjSj Cμm−1
cγ
 Sj .
Indeed it is enough to take
Sj >
2m(dj + 1)+ 2maj
cγ − 2bj Cμm−1
. (34)
From now on we thus assume that
c > max
j=1,...,m
{bj } 2C
γμm−1
. (35)
Under the foregoing choice of c, whenever sj ∈ [σj , Sj ] the corresponding Lagrange multipliers αsj ∈ [σj , Sj ], j =
1, . . . ,m.
Next let us recall that to each s = (sj ) ∈∏mj=1[σj , Sj ] there correspond (πs, (xsj ), (αsj )) ∈ K+ ×Km × Int(Rm+),‖πs‖ = c, such that (PWs) holds. Our assumption here is that πs is unique, i.e.
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∏m
j=1[σj , Sj ]  s → {πs : ‖πs‖ = c and (πs, (xsj ), (αsj )) fulfills (PWs)} is single-valued.
Since the set of all Lagrange multipliers corresponding to πs is closed, convex, bounded and nonempty, we conclude
that the mapping Λ has closed, convex, bounded and nonempty values (for the detailed study of this assertion we refer
to [20–22]).
Finally, our study will be devoted to establishing the upper semicontinuity of the mapping Λ :∏mj=1[σj , Sj ] →∏m
j=1[σj , Sj ] which assigns to any s = (sj ) ∈
∏m
j=1[σj , Sj ] the set of all corresponding Lagrange multipliers Λ(s) =
{αs = (αsj )} ⊂
∏m
j=1[σj , Sj ] fulfilling (PWs) with ‖πs‖ = c.
For this purpose suppose that sn → s as n → ∞, (αsnj ) ∈ Λ(sn) and αs
n
j → αsj . It will be proved that αsj ∈ Λ(s).
By the assumption we have
−α
sn
j
snj
πs
n ∈ ∂V j
(
snj x
sn
j
)
,〈
πs
n
, xs
n
j
〉− φj (πsn)= 0,
Φ(τ)−Φ(πsn) 〈τ − πsn, m∑
j=1
xs
n
j
〉
∀τ ∈K+,
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(PWsn )
for some xsnj and πs
n
with ‖πsn‖ = c. By the boundedness argument we can assume that
πs
n
⇀ πs, weakly in X,
xs
n
j ⇀ x
s
j , weakly in X,
for some πs ∈K+ and xsj ∈K. From (PWsn)1 it follows
V j
(
snj y
)− V j (snj xsnj ) 〈−αsnj
s
n
j
πs
n
, y − xsnj
〉
, ∀y ∈K.
Hence, by substituting y = sj
snj
xsj , passing to the limit and taking into account the weak lower semicontinuity of V j we
obtain
0 V j
(
sj x
s
j
)− lim inf
n→∞ V j
(
snj x
sn
j
)
 lim sup
n→∞
〈
−α
sn
j
s
n
j
πs
n
,
sj
snj
xsj − xs
n
j
〉
= α
s
j
sj
lim sup
n→∞
〈−πsn, xsj − xsnj 〉,
which leads to〈
πs, xsj
〉
 lim sup
n→∞
〈
πs
n
, xs
n
j
〉
, j = 1, . . . ,m. (36)
From (PWsn)3 with τ = πs substituted we easily get〈
πs,
m∑
j=1
xsj
〉
 lim inf
n→∞
〈
πs
n
,
m∑
j=1
xs
n
j
〉
.
Combining this with (36) we obtain〈
πs, xsj
〉= lim
n→∞
〈
πs
n
, xs
n
j
〉
, j = 1, . . . ,m. (37)
Therefore, thanks to the weak lower semicontinuity of Φ combined with (PWsn)3 we conclude that limn→∞ Φ(πs
n
) =
Φ(πs). Since φj = 1mΦ we get limn→∞ φj (πs
n
) = φj (πs). The maximal monotonicity of ∂V j (·) together with (37)
allows the conclusion (PWs)1 (cf. [3]). Finally, if we assume that
(H6) For any {πn} ⊂K+, if πn ⇀ π weakly in X, ‖πn‖ = c and Φ(πn) → Φ(π), then ‖π‖ = c.
Then the upper semicontinuity of Λ is easy to be established.
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for some s ∈∏mj=1[σj , Sj ]. This means that there exist πs ∈K+ with ‖πs‖ = c and (xsj ) ∈Km such that (PWs) holds
with αsj = sj . Accordingly, (PWs) takes the form
−πs ∈ ∂V j
(
sj x
s
j
)
,〈
πs, xsj
〉− φj (πs)= 0,
Φ(τ)− Φ(πs) 〈τ − πs, m∑
j=1
xsj
〉
∀τ ∈K+.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(38)
The obtained result allows the following conclusions: πs and (xsj ) are solutions of the optimization problems (compare
with (30)):
m∑
j=1
1
sj
V j
(−πs)+Φ(πs) → min
and
m∑
j=1
1
sj
V j
(
sj x
s
j
)+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xsj
)
→ min,
respectively. By this way we have shown that (Q˜) admits at least one solution. The result can be summarized as
follows.
Theorem 24. Let X be a reflexive Banach space. Suppose that there exists μ > 0 such that
‖x + y‖ μ(‖x‖ + ‖y‖), ∀x, y ∈K (39)
and Δ ∩ K ⊂ BX(0,C) = {y ∈ X: ‖y‖  C} for some C > 0. Assume that for any j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the following
hypotheses hold:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom(V j ));
(H3) ∂V j (0) = ∅;
(H4) ∂V j (0) = ∅.
Moreover, assume that
(H2) Φ(τ) γ ‖τ‖, ∀τ ∈K+, γ > 0;
(H5) The mapping
∏m
j=1[σj , Sj ]  s → {πs : ‖πs‖ = c and (πs, (xsj ), (αsj )) fulfills (PWs)} is single-valued;
(H6) For any {πn} ⊂K+, if πn ⇀ π weakly in X, ‖πn‖ = c and Φ(πn) → Φ(π), then ‖π‖ = c.
Then the multiobjective optimization problem
v-Minimize
(
Φ(π),V 1(−π), . . . , V m(−π)
)
subject to π ∈K+ \ {0}
}
(Q˜)
has at least one nontrivial properly efficient solution π ∈K+ such that ‖π‖ = c with c fulfilling the estimate (35), i.e.
m∑ 1
sj
V j (−π) +Φ(π) → min,j=1
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(i) π ∈ ∂ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
;
(ii) −π ∈ ∂V j (sj xj ) for each j = 1, . . . ,m.
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (40)
Remark 25. Note that (40) implies
(iii)
m∑
j=1
1
sj
V j (sj xj )+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
→ min (41)
(compare this with (5)(iii)).
Remark 26. The results obtained can be applied to a class of multiobjective optimization problems of the form
v-Minimize F(π) = (F0(π),F1(π), . . . ,Fm(π))
subject to π ∈K+ \ {0},
}
(PF )
where Fj : X →R, j = 0,1, . . . ,m, is a collection of proper, convex, lower semicontinuous functions, with F0 being
additionally positive homogeneous of degree 1, and K+ ⊂ X is a closed convex cone. Theorems 13 and 19 apply
when the dual positive cone K of K+ fulfills (39). In such circumstances, if we set Fj−(·) := Fj (−·), then in order to
establish the existence result our task is to check whether F0 and Fj− fulfill all the hypotheses imposed on Φ and V j ,
respectively. Note that the existence of interior points in K and K+ is not required.
Remark 27. The condition (17) in Corollary 4 related to (Q˜) takes the form: there exist an allocation (x0, (xj )) ∈
(−Δ) ×Km and (1, (sj )) ∈ Int(Rm+1+ ) such that
0 ∈ ∂ ind−K
(
m∑
j=1
xj + x0
)
−
[
m⋂
j=1
∂V j−(−sj xj )∩ ∂ indΔ(−x0)
]
, (42)
where V j−(·) := V j (−·), j = 1, . . . ,m.
5. Remark on the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics provides conditions under which a properly efficient allo-
cation (xj ) ∈Km can be supported as a price equilibrium with transfers [1,15].
Our task now is to formulate conditions on dis-utility functions V j : K → R ∪ {+∞} and budget functions
φj :K+ → R that allow to show the implication: if (xj ) is properly efficient allocation of Q˜ (a solution of (Qα)
for some α ∈ Int(Rm+)), then there exists π ∈K+ such that (π, (xj )) constitutes a competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 28. Let X be a reflexive Banach space. Suppose that there exists μ > 0 such that
‖x + y‖ μ(‖x‖ + ‖y‖), ∀x, y ∈K (43)
and Δ∩K⊂ BX(0,C) for some C > 0. Assume (xj ) to be a properly efficient allocation of Q˜ (a solution of (Qα) for
some α ∈ Int(Rm+)) and
(H1) Φ(τ) γ ‖τ‖, τ ∈K+, γ > 0.
(H2) There exist aj , bj  0 with
∑m
bj < γ such that V (−τ)−aj − bj‖τ‖, j = 1, . . . ,m.j=1 j
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= 0, such that (π, (xj )) is a competitive equilibrium with transfers in the sense that one
can find wealth levels wj  0, j = 1, . . . ,m, for which the following holds:
Vj (xj ) = min
{
Vj (x): 〈π,x〉wj , x ∈K
}
, j = 1, . . . ,m,
m∑
j=1
xj ∈ ∂Φ(π),
Φ(π) =
m∑
j=1
wj .
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(44)
Proof. In view of (43) and Δ ∩ K ⊂ BX(0,C) for some C > 0, one can find R > 0 large enough to fulfill the
requirements
For each (yj ) ∈Km:
m∑
j=1
yj ∈ Δ ⇒ ‖yj‖ < R, j = 1, . . . ,m,
and
R > max
j=1,...,m
{bj } γ∑m
k=1 bk
.
Set V jR(·) := V j (·) + indBX(0,R)(·). Then Dom(V jR) = X for each j = 1, . . . ,m. Since the properly efficient allo-
cation (xj ) has the property that
∑m
j=1 xj ∈ Δ, we have ‖xj‖ < R. Therefore, by the Fenchel theorem there is a zero
duality gap for the two problems in duality:
v := inf
(yj )∈Km
{
m∑
j=1
1
αj
V jR(yj )+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
yj
)}
=
m∑
j=1
1
αj
V j (xj )+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
(45)
and
v := inf
τ∈K+
{
m∑
j=1
(
1
αj
V jR
)
(−τ)+Φ(τ)
}
, (46)
what means that v + v = 0. Taking into account that 0 ∈ Int(Dom(V j )− BX(0,R)) we get(
1
αj
V jR
)
(−τ) =
(
1
αj
V j + indBX(0,R)
)
(−τ)
=
((
1
αj
V j
)
 indBX(0,R)
)
(−τ)
=
(
1
αj
V j
)
(−τj1)+R‖τj2‖
= 1
αj
V j (−αj τj1)+ R‖τj2‖, τj1 + τj2 = τ ∈K+. (47)
In order to establish the assertion it will be shown that (46) has a solution. From (H1) and (H2) we get the estimates:
m∑
j=1
(
1
αj
V jR
)
(−τ)+ Φ(τ)

m∑
j=1
1
αj
V j (−αj τj1)+R
m∑
j=1
‖τj2‖ + γ ‖τ‖
−
m∑ aj
αj
−
m∑
bj‖τj1‖ + R
m∑
‖τj2‖ + γ
m∑ bj∑m
j=1 bk
‖τj1 + τj2‖
j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1
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m∑
j=1
aj
αj
−
m∑
j=1
bj‖τj1‖ + R
m∑
j=1
‖τj2‖ + γ
m∑
j=1
bj∑m
k=1 bk
‖τj1‖ − γ
m∑
j=1
bj∑m
j=1 bk
‖τj2‖
−
m∑
j=1
aj
αj
+ γ −
∑m
k=1 bj∑m
k=1 bk
m∑
j=1
bj‖τj1‖ +
m∑
j=1
(
R − γ bj∑m
k=1 bk
)
‖τj2‖
from which the coercivity of the function
∑m
j=1( 1αj V jR)
(−·) + Φ(·) follows. Due to the reflexivity of X it has a
minimizer, say π ∈K+. Hence, by duality,
m∑
j=1
1
αj
V j (xj )+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
+
m∑
j=1
1
αj
V jR(−αjπ)+Φ(π) = 0 (48)
which leads to
m∑
j=1
1
αj
V j (xj )+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
+
m∑
j=1
1
αj
V j (−αjπj1)+R
m∑
j=1
‖πj2‖ +Φ(π) = 0. (49)
This can be rewritten as
m∑
j=1
(
1
αj
V j (xj )+ 1
αj
V j (−αjπj1)+ 〈πj1, xj 〉
)
+ Φ(π)+ indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
−
〈
π,
m∑
j=1
xj
〉
+
m∑
j=1
(
R‖πj2‖ + 〈πj2, xj 〉
)= 0.
By the Fenchel inequality, for each j = 1, . . . ,m,
1
αj
V j (xj )+ 1
αj
V j (−αjπj1)+ 〈πj1, xj 〉 0,
Φ(π) + indΔ
(
m∑
j=1
xj
)
−
〈
π,
m∑
j=1
xj
〉
 0
giving rise to the inequality
m∑
j=1
(
R‖πj2‖ + 〈πj2, xj 〉
)
 0.
Since ‖xj‖ < R, j = 1, . . . ,m, we easily conclude that πj2 = 0 for each j = 1, . . . ,m. This implies
v := inf
τ∈K+
{
m∑
j=1
(
1
αj
V j
)
(−τ)+ Φ(τ)
}
=
m∑
j=1
(
1
αj
V j
)
(−π) +Φ(π). (50)
Thus we are led to the conclusion that
−αjπ ∈ ∂V j (xj ), j = 1, . . . ,m,
m∑
j=1
xj ∈ ∂Φ(π).
Finally, we assert that (44) is fulfilled with the wealth levels wj := 〈π,xj 〉 for each j = 1, . . . ,m. This completes the
proof. 
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